Plaintiff corporation brought a breach of contract action against defendants, seeking recovery in a sum of over $ 1,000. The Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District (California) granted defendants’ motion for a change of venue to another judicial district, and the corporation appealed.
A corporate governance lawyerassisted the corporation with the appeal of defendants’ motion for a change of venue, relating to the breach of contract matter. On the corporation’s appeal, the court stated that defendants resided in San Diego County; thus, San Diego County was a proper county for the trial of the action. San Diego County was again a proper county because the contract was to be performed there. However, Los Angeles County was also a proper county because this county was the one in which the contract in fact was entered into. Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 395(2), a proper court was that of the judicial district in which a defendant resided or the judicial district in which the obligation was contracted to be performed. Further, the court stated that under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 397, cases could only be transferred when the court designated in the complaint was not the proper court. In the case at bar, because the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and was a proper court for the trial of the action, the court held that the motion to transfer should not have been granted. The court reversed and dismissed the appeal from the nonexistent judgment.
Defendant securities broker appealed an order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which vacated an arbitration award against plaintiff investor on the investor’s allegations of fraud and other causes of action.
The investor requested a continuance more than three years after it initiated the arbitration, more than one year beyond the original arbitration date, after the investor had once refused to appear at the arbitration hearing, and after the investor had twice brought legal actions against the broker and had twice been ordered to arbitrate. The investor filed a legal action alleging additional statutory violations but did not seek to amend its arbitration submission until several months later. Moreover, the investor offered no excuse for failing to timely assert the additional statutory claims, which arose out of the same facts. The arbitrators denied the continuance request. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the arbitrators did not abuse their discretion under Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.2, or under the applicable arbitration rules because they reasonably could have concluded that there was no good cause for further delay. Thus, the investor was not entitled to vacation of the award under Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(5). The court noted that the trial court did not have jurisdiction under Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4, to order the arbitrators to allow an amendment. The court reversed the order that had vacated the arbitration award.